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**GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE AND THE TOTAL FORCE
CHAPLAIN IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM**

BY

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GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE AND THE TOTAL FORCE CHAPLAIN IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the most comprehensive military deployment in our nation's history. It required the largest call-up and mobilization of Reserve forces since the Korean Conflict. It provided the first thorough test of the all-volunteer Total Force and it was the first execution of the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR). Mobilization is a familiar term to Reserve soldiers since they have been training to some mobilization readiness standard for years. GMR is not the familiar term that mobilization is to us. Yet, when mobilization finally occurred, after two decades of preparation, it was not a full mobilization for a war in Europe against the Soviets, but a gradually incremented activation, call-up, and partial mobilization, in the Middle East against Iraq. This paper is a study of Reserve chaplain and chaplain assistant activation in the first full experience with GMR. It reviews the origins and purpose of Total Force Policy and the GMR concept, both current and primary elements in the President's National Security Strategy. It examines the problems the Chaplain Corps encountered in responding to a GMR and makes recommendations for the best use of GMR in future contingencies.

INTRODUCTION

Many glowing adjectives have been used to describe the now historic Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As Desert Shield evolved the two most repetitive adjectives were simply "biggest" and "fastest". For it proved to be, before it was over, the "biggest", "fastest", and not just incidentally, the "farthest" military deployment in our country's history.¹ The air and ground war that followed was prophetically characterized by General Norman Schwarzkopf when he called upon his forces to be "the thunder and lightning of Desert Storm".² One is reminded of the Bible's descriptive words about the culminating event of history, "As the lightning comes from the east and flashes to the west." This war does not compare, but the analogy General Schwarzkopf chose for his forces pointedly describes the speed, precision, power, and brilliance of Desert Storm.

British military analyst John Keegan, a scholar of great repute, called it "a perfect military operation," a classic "which will be written about by military historians for decades to come."³ The brilliant 1,000-hour air campaign, capped by a stunning 100-hour ground finale, truly had observers scrambling

for adulatory phrases to describe it. Here was the world's fourth most powerful army, in numbers and armament, being brought to its knees in what will surely go down as one of history's greatest military victories.

Perhaps the crowning adjective from the lips of many is "miraculous". For what was achieved so rapidly far exceeded the most optimum outcome imagined. To list but a few of those "miracle" outcomes that elicited "miraculous" from so many: the logistical feat of moving massive amounts of soldiers, equipment, and supplies so far with such speed when one considers, as most experts then concluded, our airlift and sealift deficiencies;⁴ for a fearfully significant time, deterring a vastly superior force that well might have rolled through our initial defence forces with terrifying and bloody consequences;⁵ the truly incredible and surely least expected of all casualty rate in an operation and war of such magnitude and intensity; the broad, awe-inspiring national support for the Armed Forces and her leaders; the unlikely, historic, and amazingly cohesive coalition of nations working in concert with a once enervated United Nations toward a common goal; the long-awaited cleansing away of the "Vietnam stigma" and the healing of America's relationships with her military and its leaders;⁶ and the largest call-up and mobilization of Reserve forces

since the Korean Conflict, creating the first thorough war test of the all-volunteer Total Force and the first execution of the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept.⁷

Many stories and "miracles" of Desert Shield/Desert Storm are yet to be told, some around dinner tables, others in official reports or through the public media. Surely one story that has not been widely told due to the cultural and religious sensitivities of the region, is the ministry of those servants of God who wear the cross and tablets and the chaplain assistants who complete the Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The spiritual ministry they provided to troops in combat, soldiers throughout the Area of Responsibility (AOR), and families and soldiers back home is difficult to measure precisely or collectively. But beyond measure it played a vital part in the stunning success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It was the largest deployment of Army chaplains, and therefore UMTs, into combat since World War II.

Yet, while basking in the favorable light of success, we enjoy an unparalleled opportunity to analyze a deployment and conflict of great magnitude. First, the entire operation was of such brevity, that critique, analysis, and lessons learned can be derived from fairly complete and fresh accounts. Second, the operation's phenomenal success presents a positive

atmosphere for constructive, critical analysis. Third, the Total Force concept was put to its most thorough test in the activation and partial mobilization of the Reserve Components.⁸ Finally, it is timely, as the Armed Forces have just begun to build down and restructure toward the Total Force of the new decade and Twenty-First Century.

The Chaplain Corps is thus challenged to a careful, thorough, and expeditious analysis of what can be learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We ought to be careful, recognizing that Desert Shield/Desert Storm is not necessarily a pattern for all future conflicts. We ought to be thorough in that, despite its success, the Total Force concept, mobilization procedures, and especially our knowledge and execution of the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept have many "bugs" to be worked out before we face another crisis or conflict. Finally, we must be expeditious, for "now is the day of restructuring" and the window of opportunity is now open to institute changes from validated lessons learned.

As the rest of the Army critiques the use and performance of Total Force policy and the execution of Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, so will the Chaplain Corps. This paper is intended to assist in that critique and provide some recommendations for the future.

It is particularly focused on the use of Reserve Component chaplains and chaplain assistants in a GMR crisis. In such a crisis Total Force assets, as we are presently configured, are necessary to meet all the requirements of the Chaplain Corps mission, i.e. providing spiritual ministry to soldiers and their families wherever they are.

This is not a critique of the performance of Reserve Component UMTs who served in the Gulf. Those who observed them will make that critique, though all reports thus far are very favorable. It is rather concerned with our initial response to a GMR by meeting Chaplain mission requirements with Reserve assets as Desert Shield escalated toward Desert Storm. The recommendations proposed are toward future preparedness for GMR, which is the likely concept for the future. Also recommended is increased integration of Total Force policy in the Chaplain Corps to meet mission requirements and goals with less resources.

Both Total Force and GMR are key elements in the national security strategy. They have been tested and, at least from initial observations, proved to be very successful. While they will be refined, they are here to stay. In a day of constrained and decreasing resources, Total Force and GMR need priority attention because they are a means of maximizing the resources we have.

The Total Force Policy

The President's National Security Strategy, of March 1990, defines the Total Force Policy as a primary element in deterring conventional war:

It is clear that the United States must retain the full range of conventional military capabilities, appropriately balanced among combat and support elements, U.S. and forward-based forces, active and reserve components. We must also maintain properly equipped and well trained general purpose and special operations forces. Within these requirements, as we look to the future, we see our active forces being smaller, more global in their orientation, and having a degree of agility, readiness and sustainability appropriate to the demands of likely conflicts. . .

The United States has never maintained active forces in peacetime adequate for all the possible contingencies we could face in war. We have instead relied on reserve forces and on a pool of manpower and industrial strength that we could mobilize to deal with emergencies beyond the capabilities of our active units.

For almost two decades, our Total Force policy has placed a significant portion of our total military power in a well-equipped, well-trained, and early-mobilizing reserve component. Various elements of that policy - the mix of units in the two components, the nature of missions given reserve forces - are likely to be adjusted as we respond to changes in the security environment. Reserve forces are generally less expensive to maintain than their active counterparts

so, as we adjust force structures, retaining reserve units is one alternative for reducing costs while still hedging against uncertainties. It is an alternative we must thoroughly explore, especially as we better understand the amount of warning time we can expect for a major conflict."⁹

The Total Force Policy was an experiment entered into by the Armed Forces largely as a result of the bitter and negative experience of the Vietnam War. As Martin Binkin of Brookings Institute said for many, "America was weary of the war, weary of the military, and weary of the draft."¹⁰ Consequently, the draft was abolished in 1973, and an all-volunteer force was established. Soon after as a result of the "Gates Commission" the services adopted and, then-Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, implemented the Total Force Policy.

A number of key factors entered into its development and adoption. Chief, perhaps, at the time, was the bitterness of military leaders toward President Lyndon Johnson for resisting as long as he did the mobilization of the Reserves. He did so due to his fear of the political debate he felt would ensue. This failure to activate the Reserves created a number of detrimental effects. It dangerously weakened the active force structure in other critical world areas as forces and equipment were drawn away to support the Vietnam War. It created a haven in the Reserve for those who did not want to participate in the

war. Simply join the Reserve, they thought, and have little fear, in light of the prevailing policy, of being mobilized. Finally, as many experts concluded after, the failure to mobilize the Reserves played a major part in the failure to garner and sustain public support for the war. Such lack of support directly contributed to the war's disastrous and humiliating conclusion.

We learned it in Vietnam, and we have been reminded repeatedly from Clausewitz to Col. Harry Summers¹¹ that public support is critical to military strategy. Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Frederick C. Weyand said, "Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people. The American Army really is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement . . . When the American people lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people."¹² Reserve forces, in a manner that the active forces do not, engage the general populace in national defense crises. Activation of the Reserves brings home to American communities across the country the unmistakable reality that their everyday lives have been rent by a national emergency. It

unexpectedly takes husbands and wives from their families, teachers from their students, employees from companies that depend on them, doctors from their practices, and pastors from their congregations. It forces the leadership of the nation to make a major reassessment of the nation's goals, determination, and vital interests at least six months into a crisis. We did not have that in Vietnam. As much as the massive and rapid deployment of forces and equipment, and the unleashing of our best and newest weapons systems, the activation of the Reserves and the use of the Total Force in Desert Shield/Desert Storm defined President Bush's commitment: "No more Vietnams!"

Total Force then was instituted in the early 70's to preclude another Vietnam experience. It was also an answer for a declining defense budget and the consequent shrinking numbers in personnel strength. It allowed the Army to decrease that strength from over a million to 750,000 and still maintain eighteen divisions. That was accomplished by placing most of the support and even some combat responsibilities in the Reserves, so that today more than 50 percent of the Army's total combat units and more than 80 percent of its total service support units are in the Reserve Components.¹³ This means that for any other than the most minor contingency the Reserves must be called-up. And even the minor contingencies

require at least the activation of volunteers from the Reserves.

Since the Total Force concept was instituted, Reserve forces have served voluntarily, and because of required skills, necessarily, in the 1973 Yom Kippur War; in connection with the capture of the SS Mayaguez; in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983; in Lebanon; in the 1986 "El Dorado Canyon" raid on Libya; during the 1987-88 tanker escort operation in the Persian Gulf; and in Operation Just Cause in Panama.¹⁴

But Desert Shield/Desert Storm was something far different. It was the largest, "quickest" deployment and perhaps most intense mobilization effort in U.S. military history. It set into motion a machinery so massive and complex that many of its individual elements had never been tested together in an exercise, much less a national emergency. Interestingly, a computer/paper mobilization exercise in 1978 called "Nifty Nugget" that depicted a major deployment on the scale of Desert Shield concluded that more than half the U.S. troops involved became casualties because of inadequate logistical support.¹⁵ Nifty Nugget results provided the impetus for a joint transportation command, which with the "teeth" provided by the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, eventually produced the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

It was TRANSCOM officials who immediately, in Desert Shield, recognized the necessity of appealing for the first presidential activation of the Reserves since the 1968 Tet offensive. That activation, the 200k call-up of the Selected Reserve, took place on August 22, 1990, just 20 days after Iraq invaded Kuwait. But already, by that date, for example, the 756th Military Airlift Command (MAC) Reserve squadron was at 95 percent strength and flying "full-tilt" with Reserve volunteers who had been called to leave jobs at the dawn of the crisis. Again, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, one of the Army's Transportation Terminal Units (TTU) was on its two week annual training. Being one of eighteen TTUs in the Army, all which are in the Reserve, this unit never left active duty, serving in seven ports to include Europe. So by August 22nd many Reservists were already hard at work in the Desert Shield effort, and thousands more volunteers were in the process of activation or on lists for activation as soon as needed.

The Total Force Policy has evolved to the point that from day one Reserves are needed in the integrated effort to meet the requirements of a national emergency. When General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on December 3, 1990 he said: ". . . the success of the Guard and Reserve participation

in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen the Total Force concept."¹⁶

While the Total Force Policy is here to stay, not all is "sweetness and light" in its acceptance, its current application or its future configuration. Desert Shield/Desert Storm has proved it to be not perfect, nor implemented well in all cases and at all levels. One active Army officer involved in the deployment told Army Times, ". . . the Reserves are unusable. We've proven that . . . They take too long to get ready and too long to get going." He concludes that Desert Shield/Desert Storm "has demonstrated to the Army that we need 30 days worth of combat, combat support, and combat service support troops on active duty to be prepared for a major contingency such as the Iraqi invasion."¹⁷ This argument is but a part of the continuous debate over the "right" mix of active and Reserve forces and whether or not we should or could afford to maintain an "all active", self-sufficient contingency corps. This most certainly will be reexamined in the Desert Shield/Desert Storm aftermath.

Finally, there are the Total Force Policy and activation decisions by the Army leadership in Desert Shield/Desert Storm

that drew fire from Reserve, active and congressional elements. The failure to activate certain combat service support units, headquarters, and headquarters elements that had trained for years under a Middle East/Third Army/CENTCOM (i.e. CAPSTONE) mission created real ire. Just as controversial, and drawing universal attention, was the failure to initially activate and deploy the National Guard Roundout brigades with their Roundout units. This debate will rage for some time with worthy points on both sides.¹⁸

The greater problem here is one of integrity. Systemic, if not personal, integrity was not exercised in the implementation of the Roundout concept nor in some aspects of the Total Force policy prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The continually stated missions aimed at national emergency conflicts and mobilization, and the readiness reports received, were abandoned when the crisis arrived.¹⁹ Now credibility will have to be reestablished, trust re-earned, and elements of the Total Force policy reevaluated and reshaped.

The Chaplain Corps of both components is certainly not a bystander in this controversy. UMTs serve in all affected units and are also impacted by the execution of Total Force policy and the integrity of the Army. It behooves the Chaplain Corps, active and Reserve, to understand the Total Force

concept and to bring to the discussion integrity, knowledge, balance, appreciation, and vision. Active component chaplains at all levels, and particularly senior, need to seriously increase their knowledge of and experience with the Total Force concept, the Reserve Component system, and Reserve UMT personnel. Unfortunately, practice and priorities are too often reflected as in one senior chaplain's evaluation of the Reserve Component Issues briefing at the last Chief of Chaplains' UMT Training Conference: "Not very relevant or interesting."²⁰ Compare that comment with one of the senior chaplain assistant evaluations: "Very interesting in respect to the reasons we are here. How about interfacing reserve with active more often - expose the chaplaincy to a broader horizon."²¹

It is incumbent upon active and Reserve component chaplains and assistants to understand the rationale and necessity of the Total Force policy and structure, and to appreciate the difference in the two with mutual respect for the dictates of those differences. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Honorable Stephen Duncan, said in a recent speech: "The Total Force Policy was never intended to make full-time active soldiers and part-time Reservists mirror images of each other. It would be expensive,

unnecessary, and unrealistic to attempt to make every National Guard and Reserve unit the absolute equal, in terms of mission assignment, readiness, and capability, of the best active units."²² Duncan's comments contrast the differences in Active and Reserve due to the dictates of time, resources, and environment for training, working, and learning together. It does not draw a distinction or comparison of natural abilities and skills that reside in both, or the desire to achieve excellence in performance and readiness commensurate with those constraints.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm has demonstrated the necessity of Total Force integration in our planning, training, and execution for all future crises and conflicts. The TRADOC Commander, General John Foss said recently:

"A Total Force vision that includes full participation by the National Guard and Army Reserve in the early planning stages of leader development, training, combat developments and doctrine programs is essential for the Army of the future. We cannot afford to develop concepts or plans in any of the TRADOC functions . . . that focus only on the active component and then try to bring in the Guard and Reserve as an afterthought . . . The time is appropriate for some creative thinking. As we build down the Army, we can ill afford to have unnecessary duplication of schools, training concepts or force design initiatives within each component of the total force."²³

It has been truly said that the way we train is the way we will fight. If it seems certain we will fight future conflicts as a Total Force, then we must realistically plan and train as a Total Force.

Prodigious efforts by the Chaplain Corps produced successful results in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. However, we also learned that in this Total Force effort we were not as prepared, not as knowledgeable, and not as integrated in Total Force implementation as we should be. Fortunately, we were not tested more severely by a more protracted or deadly conflict. What we experienced was an excellent test to provide a good analysis of where we realistically stand in Total Force integration, structure, and implementation.

GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE (GMR)

Desert Shield/Desert Storm escalated in graduated increments. No one knew just how big, deadly, or protracted it would become. There was no mobilization of Reserves at the beginning, so mobilization plans were not implemented. As initial requirements for Reserve chaplains or UMTs became apparent, the response was to fill those requirements with volunteers from lists, or solicit volunteers, with the dominant selector being "known performance or quality". Such selection

is understandable as those who have borne responsibility for personnel decisions know. In a crisis you want assurance that your personnel decisions will meet the test. While it is understandable in the moment, such decisions cannot be divorced from the big picture. From the beginning, Reserve personnel decisions must take into account the Reserve activation/mobilization personnel system in place, the activated person's current assignment, and the potential speed and depth of the operation's escalation. That is to say, you must consider the consequences of early decisions on what may potentially follow. There must be coordination with the players of responsibility in the Reserve personnel system. The person activated must be fully aware of the ramifications of further escalation for him and for his current assignment. There must be some plan to make the necessary adjustments for follow-on readiness if escalation continues. This is precisely why a Graduated Mobilization Response plan is needed. Its intent would be to best meet a gradually escalating contingency without unduly compromising follow-on mobilization requirements or a deploying unit's readiness.

The crisis of Desert Shield/Desert Storm marks the first use of GMR and the first ever use of the Presidential 200k Call-up Authority.²⁴ The political reluctance to call the

Reserves that had been previously so widely espoused, never materialized with this President and Secretary of Defense. Apparently, the National Command Authority (NCA) and our military leadership understood very well the implications and realities of two decades of Total Force policy practice. Therefore, from the very onset of the crisis the concept of a call-up was approved. From the beginning "the action officers in the Joint Staff worked on the call-up to determine when and how many, not IF it were to happen."²⁵ However, despite two decades of Total Force policy and consequent mobilization training, refinements, doctrine development, and exercises, "many of the senior leadership, military and civilian, were unfamiliar with the mobilization process and others were still oriented toward a general mobilization for a large war, not Graduated Mobilization Response for a contingency."²⁶

GMR was originated as a concept late in the Carter Administration to provide a mobilization alternative to Full or Total Mobilization envisioned for a large scale European war.²⁷ Its purpose was to provide planning and procedure for activation/mobilization actions to be used as either an actual response or a deterrent in smaller contingencies. As a concept it includes political and economic actions as well as military actions, and President Bush used all of them in response to

Iraqi aggression. From August 2, 1990 to January 23, 1991 he signed eleven executive orders, from the declaration of a national emergency on August 2nd to the designation of the Arabian Peninsula airspace and adjacent waters as a Combat Zone on January 23rd. Other executive orders within those dates blocked Iraqi and Kuwaiti government property, prohibited transactions with Iraq and occupied Kuwait, dealt with chemical and biological weapons proliferation, directed national security industrial responsiveness, and national emergency construction authority. The executive orders, during this time, which related directly to the military, ordered the Selected Reserve to Active Duty; suspended any provision of law related to promotion, retirement, or separation; authorized the extension of the period of active duty of the Selected Reserve; and ordered the Ready Reserve to Active Duty.

Each step of the crisis produced a graduated response intended to deter Iraqi aggression, force a withdrawal of that aggression and a willingness to comply with United Nations resolutions. Continued intransigence and violation of international law, as well as non-compliance with United Nations resolutions by Iraq, brought an escalation of response from the U.S. and her allies. Militarily the U.S. continued to build up its forces and its capability, logistically and

tactically, to defend itself, expel Iraq from Kuwait, and force compliance with the Resolutions. In so doing it gradually escalated the activation and mobilization of the Reserves commensurate with the requirements of the Total Force being assembled.

Despite its practical and realistic value as a concept, and that it was originated over a decade ago, GMR has not been exercised, nor written widely into available doctrine, nor made part of formal planning in mobilization SOPs. The Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS), and the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) primary among others, while certainly containing applicable principles, nevertheless are focused upon Full or Partial Mobilization. Consequently, when Desert Shield began and did not move immediately to Partial Mobilization, many headquarters proceeded with varying degrees of uncertainty and confusion to meet the emerging requirements for Reserve forces. Most surely did not have GMR SOPs ready at hand.

The Chaplain Corps, as others, felt its way day by day responding to requirements. Various headquarters sometimes acted independently of other headquarters, producing an assortment of procedures rather than a unified one. An

ARPERCEN Chaplain lessons learned paper said: "ODS (Operation Desert Shield) was an evolution of circumstances not a precipitous event and in the beginning each scene was responded to as if there were no connection. Players demonstrated a lack of knowledge about the chain of events in personnel actions and the system was routinely short circuited."²⁹ In an interview at a CONUSA Chaplain office it was said that "there were too many audibles called at the line of scrimmage" and "there was confusion as to what each participating MACOM's actual responsibilities were."³⁰ One major installation Chaplain agreed that "the system was not coordinated. It looked like everyone was working independently."³¹

The evidence was fairly clear that preparation for mobilization had not fully prepared us for a GMR. It was also apparent that current funding, orders, and personnel systems were not clearly understood at the beginning. Training and familiarization opportunities in these areas (e.g. the ARPERCEN orientation) had not been fully appreciated or utilized prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm by those who most needed to know. Our experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm ought to heighten the priority of those training opportunities in the future. This is not an Active or Reserve, but a total Army problem. Even Reservists are unfamiliar with proper

channels and utilization of funding resources in the activation of Reserves.

GMR, then, is an evolving concept within the Defense community. Desert Shield/Desert Storm will give it its greatest impetus for future development and dissemination throughout the Army community. The President's National Security Strategy also addresses graduated response as one of its key elements:

A credible industrial mobilization capability contributes to deterrence and alliance solidarity by demonstrating to adversaries and friends alike that we are able to meet our commitments. While important progress has been made in recent years, more can be done to preserve our ability to produce the weapons and equipment we need. Mobilization plans will also have to reflect our changing understanding of warning for a global war and develop graduated responses that will themselves signal U.S. resolve and thus contribute a deterrence.³²

Gradual use of Reserves beginning with volunteers was the approach used in this crisis and is a sensible and realistic approach to use in future and similar contingencies.

Based on this recent experience, the force structure of the future will most likely depend on full use of GMR, using warning time to ready the total force needed. Because of the decline in the Soviet Threat, the U.S. now has sufficient

warning time to forge a response before an enemy can generate enough combat power to initiate a large scale conventional war. In light of Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the view of a number of experts the military should have as much as six months lead time to prepare for a major war. Consequently, the Chaplain Corps must prepare for the likely ministry requirements it will face in a gradual response to such contingencies; from utilization of needed Reserve UMT volunteers to increased activation, partial mobilization, or more.

As force planners view the future and the policy of GMR in light of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, they are certain to consider the structuring of time constrained forces packages that do not include Reserves, i.e. forces packages for 60 or 90 days needing no Reservists. If the GMR is successful within that time frame no activation or call-up would be necessary. However, creating such forces packages may prove to be too costly and too restrictive. It will require even more deactivation of combat forces to afford a greater assortment of active combat service support units. Nevertheless, if the crisis extends beyond the 60 or 90 day limit, a Reserve call-up, considering the post-Vanguard size of the Total Force, would still be necessary.

The all-active forces packages proponents must also consider the loss of the benefits derived from early use of Reserves in a national crisis, as discussed earlier. On the other hand such force planning if executed will create an adverse affect on the Reserve program. Without the real potential of being used in anything but an all-out war, the Reserve program would atrophy. As it currently stands it is energized as a program by the reality of its readiness requirements. Maximum and intelligent use must be made of the Reserve Components and their special skills in all contingencies; not only in military contingencies, but in civil emergencies, and in the third world. Use and integration of the Reserves with Active forces creates healthy results which flow to both. It produces a positive view of the military by the people of the nation.

However, no matter what direction the force planners go, Reserve UMT support will be necessary in almost all contingency scenarios. When a deployment of active forces is required their UMTs deploy with them. Because garrison or TDA UMT strength is what it is, Reserve UMT assistance is needed to continue full and adequate ministry to the families of the deployed soldiers. The principle and the need were established in Just Cause and Desert Shield. Now the procedure must be improved and perfected before our soldiers deploy again.

INITIAL RESERVE UMT ACTIVATION IN DESERT SHIELD

Operation Just Cause was a harbinger for the Chaplain Corps prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. No one, however, envisioned anything like Desert Shield bursting upon the world stage so soon after Panama. When elements of both the 7th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions rapidly deployed to Panama from Ft. Ord and Ft. Bragg, chaplains from both installations requested Reserve UMT support. Ft. Ord particularly needed Reserve help when a significant number of UMTs deployed with their units and there was not enough UMT personnel left to fill the gap. Several Army hospitals assigned the mission to prepare for potential mass casualties requested Reserve UMT assistance. But in this operation entire divisions did not deploy, the deployment was short, and casualties were so light that the situation did not become more critical. However, the crisis did demonstrate the need for a rapid influx of Reserve UMT personnel to provide assistance in family ministry and potential mass casualty situations.

Soon after, the Chief of Chaplains' Mobilizing the Force Subcommittee, in reviewing lessons learned from Just Cause, discussed the possible need for Reserve UMTs trained as crisis ministry teams to rapidly respond in such contingencies. They

would be activated in support of installations that had deployed units, or to hospitals preparing for mass casualties. Such teams could be formed within the IMA program structure, and/or with Troop Program Unit (TPU) UMTs in close proximity to those installations most affected by contingency operations. But before these ideas were developed, Iraq invaded Kuwait and we were thrust into a massive test of GMR without having devised a GMR plan.

The 82nd Airborne was the first unit to deploy in Desert Shield. This time, however, it deployed as an entire division (plus) for the first time since World War II. Ft. Bragg had 71 chaplains and 80 chaplain assistants assigned prior to Desert Shield. After the deployment only 7 chaplains and 15 chaplain assistants were available to carry on the command master religious program, to continue its outstanding Community of Excellence program, and most critically, to provide spiritual ministry to those left behind: the families of the 82nd Airborne Division and supporting units, the rear detachments, and the non-deployable soldiers. Upon mobilization the plans call for Reserve UMTs to arrive at the installations with their units. With the coordinated efforts of non-deployed garrison UMTs, assigned IMAs, and retirees from the MOBTDA, the religious program is continued and the families of deployed soldiers receive chaplain support.

But Desert Shield did not begin as a mobilization. The 82nd Airborne Division deployed rapidly to the CENTCOM AOR in Saudi Arabia. Families were immediately in the midst of crisis separation. Single-parent soldiers or dual-military parents were trying to put family plans into action. Weddings were moved up. Some unplanned weddings were created by the crisis. Others requested ceremonies to reaffirm vows. Attendance at chapel services increased dramatically, as did requests for counseling. Conscientious objectors required interviews. Family financial problems were exacerbated by impending separation. Anxieties and fears were severely multiplied.

The enemy this time was not a contingent of Cuban forces on a small island, nor the Panamanian Defense Forces, but the fourth most powerful army in the world. It was an army with modern tanks, artillery prowess, tactical missiles, high-tech aircraft, helicopter gunships, and a horrendous stockpile of chemical/biological weapons, which they had used before with terrifying, well-publicized results. The knowledge of this array of lethal, mass casualty weapons and vast numbers of soldiers was paraded before the world by the media. It was impossible for the eyes, ears, and hearts of soldiers' families to escape it. Numerous reports such as one entitled "By the Poisons of Babylon,"³³ spoke of Iraq's poison gas capability.

One Army psychiatrist's study had predicted that the ratio of psychiatric combat casualties to wounded would be as much as two times higher in a war in which chemical/ biological weapons are used.³⁴ But no one had predicted what would be the increased impact of psychological terror on spouses, children and families of the soldiers who deployed.

This operation was an escalating crisis that produced a fearful "waiting game". A time-line was drawn in the sand. The soldiers were engrossed in serious preparations and training, but for the families back home the "waiting game" became an increasing, emotionally-draining experience. To add to this, the 82nd would be for a time all alone on the ground deterring a force that outnumbered them by the 100s of thousands. Similar anxieties and fears would also impact the families of the 101st and 24th Divisions, who soon followed the 82nd, and the families of the many Reservists whose units were deploying early as part of the massive logistics team.

It is no wonder, then, that one Reserve chaplain upon arriving at Ft. Bragg in October from Israel found what he described as "a very somber, morbid, mournful spirit on post and among the families" that he knew needed immediate, hope-producing spiritual ministry.³⁵ This scene was affirmed by the observation of a former battalion commander, whose former

battalion deployed to the Gulf soon after he reported to the Army War College. After a November visit to Ft. Bragg he said that he had never witnessed such outward anxiety, stress, and fear among wives and families in all his years of service.

This crisis presented many formidable challenges, but also unparalleled opportunity for chaplain ministry and UMT support to soldiers and their families. Army Chief of Staff General Vuono was concerned from the outset for Army families and communities. He made it clear that he was depending on the Chaplain Corps and their skills in spiritual ministry at a time when the Army community was being severely tested.

It was his intent that both Active and Reserve families find that support within the Army community and not have to "go downtown" for it. This is part of his message:

Today, as the Army stands firm against aggression in the Arabian Desert, our communities are crucial in providing the services for families who suddenly find themselves with soldiers in a far away land. Our soldiers are entitled to deploy with the confidence of knowing that their loved ones are being cared for and that their needs are being fully met. This will only happen if every member of our communities at every level makes an uncompromising commitment to provide our families with responsive services, whether they live on post or in the surrounding area.

Army communities that are mobilization stations have special responsibilities in welcoming soldiers and families from our Reserve components. Many of them will be unfamiliar with community procedures and will need help. Above all, we must ensure that no soldier or family member is denied the services they deserve because of artificial or cumbersome peacetime requirements. Our reserve components are full partners in the Total Army Team and must be accorded the same outstanding services and support that characterize our communities throughout the world.³⁶

In the midst of a rapid deployment, chaplains and UMTs of deploying divisions and units would be hard pressed to cover all the bases of ministry and needs. They also had personal preparation responsibilities connected with impending separation from families, while increasingly, the soldiers of their deploying units needed their ministry.

Without belaboring the point, this is precisely why the garrison chaplain needs a rapid influx of Reserve UMTs to provide ministry in the midst of deployment as well as after. But they need to be UMTs familiar with the installation; UMTs who know something of the religious program in place, the active UMT personnel, the units and their commanders, the family support group structure, the resources available, and how those resources are managed. These planned for, familiarized UMTs would also provide liaison with Reserve UMTs

due to activate and deploy through that installation. The extent of that liaison to include Reserve UMT certification will be discussed later.

In Desert Shield/Desert Storm the first Reserve chaplains did not begin to arrive until the last few days of August and early September and then only a handful. Chaplain assistants came much later and then only in smaller numbers than the chaplains. They remained in critical short supply throughout the operation. While chaplain assistant numbers in the Reserve components are low, we were not prepared to draw on the resources that are there. Subsequently, most of the CA requirements at those installations needing support were never filled, creating a negative impact on chaplain ministry and responsibilities.

A number of factors contributed to the slow activation of Reserve chaplains and assistants. Some installations were slow to request support early in Desert Shield. Second Army Chaplain's office, expecting that support would be needed, even called installations in their area to offer help and see what requirements might be expected. It is clear that there was some initial reluctance to have Reserve UMTs activated immediately. Most likely the reluctance relates to unfamiliarity with the Reserve UMTs that would be activated.

The fear is basically one of "not now, we are too busy with deployment to orient new personnel to what's going on here." Such reluctance is understandable, but points to the weakness in our preparation and readiness for such contingencies. Consequently, we are not able to provide all the ministry that we could or should in such a crisis by maximizing the use of all Total Force assets.

Having learned many lessons in Desert Shield/Desert Storm the Chaplain Corps should proceed without delay to the development of a GMR plan; a plan flexible to small or large contingencies that begin short of any level of mobilization.

GRADUATED MOBILIZATION RESPONSE PLAN

The Chief of Chaplain's Mobilizing the Force Subcommittee would most likely be given the responsibility to develop or supervise the development of a GMR plan. The plan would provide direction for GMR SOPs at each level. It should define GMR, and Chaplain Corps missions required in a GMR. Lines of responsibility for each graduated level of the GMR should be delineated. Priority and procedure of Reserve volunteer activation and UMT requirements at each graduated level should be addressed. Laws and regulations applying to each level need to be stated since they may vary within the graduated levels of

activation, call-up and mobilization. There are distinctions between Reserve and Guard of which to be aware. The funding of Reserves in a GMR should be laid out clearly to include the guidelines for Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD). There was definite confusion in this arena in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but that should not have been, and does not need to be, in the future. The pre-positioning of chaplain supplies should be addressed. The partial shipment of personal goods (e.g. 800 pounds) for those Reservists serving outside the AOR over six months was a point of contention and needs to be clarified. Volunteers serving in a gradually escalating crisis may find that they are automatically extended by partial mobilization. This situation needs to be researched and clearly defined, since it will have an impact on the availability of some needed volunteers in any future crisis.

The plan must address those situations which call for UMT support, but for which there is no provision when mobilization has not yet occurred. Family support ministry to the families of activated Reserve units must be ensured prior to mobilization, not just after mobilization. Those families are not as co-located as active families are on and around an installation. Nor are they as familiar with support services and Army procedures. Therefore, the task may present some

unique difficulties. But it has the interest and support of the Army Chief of Staff.

Chaplain support to casualty assistance and notification of next of kin must be provided for in the plan. One DA scenario presented to DACH prior to Desert Storm called for 2300 chaplains to be assigned to this mission. Obviously, the scenario was not a workable one. Nevertheless, there was a substantial effort undertaken in gearing up for the potential of mass casualties. ARPERCEN was given the responsibility to recall retirees to staff Casualty Area Commands (CAC). Planning also called for the use of any Reserve or active chaplains available to assist in each of the areas. The Ft. Bragg Commander, concerned that there would not be enough chaplains available, directed his garrison chaplain to establish a volunteer civilian clergy program. Ft. Bragg chaplains conducted at least three training sessions for civilian clergy in casualty assistance and notification of next of kin ministry. The sessions were reported as quite successful and, though their services were not needed, resulted in greater clergy and community support for the crisis and for the military chaplain's ministry.

Since lay volunteers from military families and civilian communities provided hours of lay help to chaplain offices and

chapel programs, the plan could recommend the enlisting of lay volunteers in a crisis to perform functions for which there is no available assistance. Ft. Bragg achieved great success in the utilization of such volunteers.

Chaplain Corps regulations and resources need to be reviewed in light of GMR contingencies to determine if any additions or changes need to be made. The plan should list all publications and documents pertinent to ministry and missions in a GMR. One reference book that was high on everyone's list, and clearly a "top performer" in Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the Unit Ministry Team Handbook (RB1-1).

Perhaps the most important area to be addressed in this plan is the utilization of the UMT Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program to meet the ministry needs presented by a GMR contingency. This program is adaptable to the creation of crisis ministry teams within the MOBTOA/TOE structure. Such teams would prepare to be voluntarily activated in the initial stages of a GMR crisis. Activation would be contingent on the basis of the unique support requirements of the particular crisis. The experience of the last two GMR operations demonstrates the need for Reserve UMT support at installations from which contingency units are deploying, at installations where activated Reserve units are preparing for deployment, and

at Army hospitals selected to prepare for potential mass casualties. Other support missions with high priority in a GMR might include augmentation of participating MACOM chaplain staffs, and three activities that have no assigned UMT personnel in peacetime: Casualty Area Commands (CAC), the Casualty Memorial Affairs Operations Command (CMOAC), and the Dover AFB mortuary activity.

The IMA crisis ministry teams assigned to installations would be specifically trained in family support ministries and crisis intervention. They would also develop familiarity with their assigned installations, the active UMTs of the installation, units and their commanders, family support group structure, service agencies, religious programs, resources available, et cetera. The Drilling IMA (DIMA) program could enhance the effectiveness of these teams by providing more frequent interface and training throughout the year based on monthly drills at the installation in addition to two weeks annual training. If, as planned, they will provide support to the rear detachments and families of units with special qualifications (i.e. airborne, air assault, etc.), they should also receive qualification training in those skills. At least one incident in Desert Shield/Desert Storm indicated non-acceptance of a "leg" Reserve chaplain by a rear detachment

airborne commander and a lesser ranking active chaplain. They should have recognized that they had not planned prior to the operation to ensure that there would be acceptable UMT support for the families of their unit when the entire division was deployed. Trained crisis ministry teams within the UMT IMA program would change that in future contingencies.

The Mobilization Station Chaplain and chaplain assistant are primary players in a GMR contingency when Reserve units are called-up, especially for deployment. They must be familiar with Reserve structure and systems, activation or mobilization procedures, Reserve UMT certification, and how to coordinate to ensure Reserve UMT fill, preferably prior to activation and movement to the Mob Station. Through interviews and lessons learned it is indicated that these positions would be best filled by IMA UMTs with the rank of Colonel and Master Sergeant. At installations designated as primary locations for activation/mobilization of Reserve units in a GMR, the Mob Station UMT should be DIMA positions. As reservists they would be more knowledgeable about Reserve systems and procedures. They could concentrate their training time on keeping the GMR plan current and coordinating with all Reserve unit UMTs likely to activate or mobilize at their installation. They could maintain a knowledge of UMT certification procedures and ensure

necessary support for adequate chaplain supplies. They would prepare to provide MOB station UMT training and resource materials and documents helpful for ministry in a combat environment. They would coordinate also on a regular basis with Reserve and Guard liaison officers at their installation. All of these areas showed varying degrees of, but fairly universal, deficiencies in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

MACOMs, installations, and hospitals who have utilized the IMA program already know its value and have used it to great advantage in this operation. Its most glaring weaknesses are the lack of validated chaplain assistant positions and chaplain assistant personnel to fill them; the lack of certain validated chaplain positions at some key GMR installations as addressed previously; and the lack of chaplain personnel to fill all of the validated positions. If Reserve UMT personnel available to the IMA program do not increase sufficiently, through Vanguard and recruiting, to provide enough crisis ministry teams to support a GMR contingency, then TPU UMTs in both Reserve and Guard will have to be tapped.

TPU UMTs located in close proximity to an installation with contingency units, could devote some IDT or ADT time to training and familiarization similar to the IMA crisis ministry teams. They would have to be assigned to units that

are not a high priority for activation in a GMR and they would have to be willing and ready to volunteer for activation in a GMR.

Obviously, insufficient numbers of Reserve UMT personnel calls for flexibility in GMR planning. As in Desert Shield/Desert Storm we may have to rely on the activation of TPU UMTs and other-assigned IMA UMTs who are not as likely to be activated, to meet crisis ministry requirements. However, this could lead to some compromise of unit readiness in a protracted conflict. Following a GMR plan will greatly aid in minimizing any confusion or compromise that may occur. Planned exceptions are easier to deal with in a crisis than the problems that result when there is no plan.

THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF VANGUARD

Vanguard, creating both a smaller active and Reserve component, should be considered a catalyst to more integrated use of Total Army UMT assets. We ought to take some lessons from the Air Force who exercise great flexibility in Total Force integration. The Air Force has always led the services in integrating Reserves into their active structure and missions. When you fly on MAC, for example, the air crew may be active, Reserve, or a mix, but unless you ask you would not

know.³⁷ The Air Force did not bat an eyelash over activating Reserve fighter squadrons for combat in the Gulf.³⁸ This is because of the way they integrate training and operational evaluation in accomplishing common missions, with common standards, in peacetime. When resources become constrained, as they will in Vanguard, we may be able to accomplish more ministry by integrating our components as never before, and improve GMR readiness while doing it. We have the skills and capabilities in both components to exploit a similar flexibility as the Air Force in the Total Army Chaplain Corps.

We need to examine ways in which Reserve UMTs can more frequently work with active UMTs in some common ministry environments. It will, of course, require overcoming some geographical limitations. The IMA program is currently the most integrated active/Reserve program. With potential growth and some realignment to meet GMR contingencies, it will provide the greatest source of and impetus for active/Reserve integration.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the last of the three primary Ready Reserve categories, is intended by the Army to provide pre-trained wartime requirements for expansion of the Total Force. It is to provide mobilization fill of potential

cadre units, replacements for casualties, and fill of deploying units under full strength. When IRR UMT personnel train it is either for military education at USACHCS or, in most cases, with the Active component. It receives the last priority in Reserve training funds and is only guaranteed funds for military education required for promotion. The UMT IRR population has tended to be a "mixed bag". On the chaplain side it contains new chaplains needing to complete the Chaplain Basic Course; chaplains in transit between units; chaplains waiting for a unit position to open; shortage denomination chaplains who need to be free of assignment to serve wherever and whenever needed for two weeks to six months when available; chaplains in overseas missions; chaplains in civilian advanced studies or with civilian job demands that presently preclude greater participation; chaplains on profile for one reason or another to include weight or physical condition; chaplains resigning or, having lost endorsement, awaiting separation (which can take up to six months or longer); chaplains due to retire because of MRD. The chaplain IRR is not very large (200+), and the chaplain assistant IRR (500+) is currently managed by non-UMT managers and is by and large neglected. To be able to receive a faster computer review of IRR assets in a GMR contingency or at mobilization, the IRR needs to be

reconfigured into two control groups: "R" for deployable assets (ready) and "H" for non-deployable assets (holding) awaiting some type of action, separation, or retirement.

In Desert Shield/Desert Storm or any other GMR or mobilization contingency, DA plans call for use of IRR personnel for fill in a number of situations as listed above. Our primary personnel decision makers did not want to rely on the IRR for potential casualty replacements, or fill of deploying units, largely because they were unsure of what was there. They assumed a poorer quality of personnel, which is not always true. Some IRRs were activated immediately to fill Reserve and active UMT positions and all reportedly performed extremely well. There always is excellent quality in the IRR, even though it is also a "holding group" for a few who are being separated for lack of performance or non-participation or loss of endorsement. This situation can be improved by dividing the IRR into two control groups recommended above, and by personnel management of the IRR. The Reserve chaplain personnel manager should know what personnel assets are in the IRR at any given time and give a clear assessment to DACH, FORSCOM, and USARC in the event of a GMR or mobilization crisis.

As we now begin to implement Vanguard, what impact will it have on the Reserve components? The Reserve component UMT strength is not now, nor has it ever been at 100%. UMT positions in the USAR and ARNG are not all filled, particularly chaplain assistant positions. The IMA program has only recently attained 50% fill, but fluctuates constantly due to loss or gain of MOBTDA/TOE positions and personnel transfers or retirements. The IRR strength is so small that it currently falls approximately 1000 chaplains and 500 chaplain assistants short of wartime requirements. Chaplain assistant requirements would be greater except that 71L (clerk typist) personnel are considered suitable mobilization substitutions for 71Ms. Therefore, it is not possible to fill all IMA UMT positions, of which there are very few validated chaplain assistant positions, from the IRR. Nor, is it possible to rely on the IRR by current numbers alone to meet fill requirements, casualty replacement, or cadre unit needs, if they are created, upon activation, call-up, or mobilization.

The execution of Vanguard plans will bring deactivation of both active and Reserve units. This should produce a number of available trained UMT personnel to help fill TPU and IMA positions, and add to the strength of the IRR. But retention of these personnel assets in the Reserve program will require

effective personnel management and adequate training funds. There must be encouragement, incentive, and viable possibilities for participation to pursue a Reserve career.

Vanguard is a foregone conclusion, but, in a positive tone, presents an opportunity to increase the strength of our Reserve programs. When deactivation occurs, or UMT personnel leave active duty, we need to retain in the Reserve component as many trained UMT personnel as possible, even as we continue to recruit new personnel.

Congress will continue to fund Reserve training, therefore adequate funding for these programs is not out of the question. However, it will require aggressive budgeting that is supported by well conceived training plans. Those training plans should reflect the flexibility of Reserve and active UMTs in meeting common missions and readiness requirements.

Effective competition for training funds, and proactive, thorough personnel management, requires an immediate, overdue increase in the staff of the ARPERCEN Chaplain Office. Three chaplains and two civilians simply cannot manage the entire chaplain candidate program and all USAR chaplain personnel matters for which it is presently responsible, to include the combined budget for both programs. The Air Force Reserve (counterpart) office manages one third the number of our

Reserve chaplains with double the number of chaplain staff and triple the number of chaplain assistants or civilians. The ARPERCEN Chaplain Office needs, as a minimum, four (preferably five) chaplains, one chaplain assistant (with the management responsibilities for IMA and MRR chaplain assistants) and three civilians. The military increases could come from either the Active or the AGR program. The needed expansion and potential of the IMA program will not be accomplished without these staff increases. Nor will we be as prepared to retain the UMT assets made available by Vanguard. Implementing these increases must be a high priority if we are to sustain our future readiness posture.

CONCLUSION

Aspects of Reserve UMT activation and support in Desert Shield/Desert Storm have been evaluated with the purpose of preparing the Chaplain Corps for future conflicts. Preparing for the worst was a principle used to great affect in this operation. We enjoyed the luxury of a swift and brief battle. The next conflict, beginning with a smaller, Vanguard Army, could be more protracted with higher casualty rates. Based on the lessons we learned in the positive environment of this operation, we must prepare for the worst, and plan for a longer and higher-casualty conflict. That preparation and planning, with constrained resources, will require the Chaplain Corps to be innovative and visionary in integrating our Total Force personnel so as to achieve the maximum ministry with what we are given.

Many parts contributed to the amazing success we are still enjoying from Desert Shield/Desert Storm. It was perhaps one of history's greatest "team efforts". It was a team effort of many nations working together with unprecedented coordination and cooperation. It was a team effort of civilian and military

leadership that is unparalleled in recent American history. It was a team effort of active and Reserve forces that had not been duplicated to this degree since World War II. President Bush said it was a victory that "belongs to the Regulars, to the Reserves, to the National Guard. This victory belongs to the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history."³⁹

It was a team effort of active and Reserve chaplains and chaplain assistants who worked together and sacrificed as a team to provide a vital, powerful, and effective ministry. The CENTCOM Chaplain, David Peterson, said ". . . during my career in the military I have never seen, experienced, or witnessed a more effective or significant ministry by chaplains . . ."⁴⁰ Active and Reserve chaplains and chaplain assistants are a powerful team with an absolutely vital ministry and message to this Army and the Army of the future.

It is that kind of ministry that former Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall wanted from his chaplains and recognized as vital to victory. He said:

"I am deeply concerned as to the type of chaplain we get into the Army, for I look upon the spiritual life of the soldier as even more important than his physical equipment. . . The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, the soldier's soul are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him, he cannot be relied upon and will fail himself and his

commander and his country in the end. It's morale - and I mean spiritual morale - which wins the victory in the ultimate, and that type of morale can only come out of the religious nature of a soldier who knows God and who has the spirit of religious fervor in his soul. I count heavily on that type of man and that kind of Army."⁴¹

Such is the spirit and message reflected in the words of VII Corps' Chaplain Dan Davis, "Commanders can get other information from any place. The chaplain ought to have a message from God. I ask my chaplains to be in touch with the living God so they can bring soldiers to God and God to soldiers."⁴² In order for our citizen-soldier chaplains to deliver that message it was necessary that they leave their civilian congregations to serve the soldiers and families of our armed forces. A portion of a letter sent by Reserve Chaplain Randy Nabors to his congregation just before he was activated, speaks not only of the sacrifice of Reserve chaplains, but of the spirit of many citizen-soldiers who were part of the team effort of Desert Shield/Desert Storm:

"I want to thank all of you who have been praying for me, and the church, concerning the possibility of my being called up to active duty. Last week one of our Ruling Elders was activated. Recently my unit was placed on alert. This means that probably one day this week I will be called and given 72 hours to report for duty.

I want to emphasize that word, "duty."
It is my obligation to do my duty.
It is also a great privilege. I am
obligated because I freely chose to
serve my country by being in the Reserves.
Duty is work that ought to be done, needs
to be done, must be done, by one who
enjoys certain privileges. My privilege
is to be an American, to be a servant
of God, and to be able to serve God in
the Army. Not many have that opportunity.
I don't want you to look on my going as
a tragedy.

Far too many spend much of their lives
trying to escape duty and obligation,
or else they pursue it out of guilt
or for power. I am a free man because
Jesus made me so. It is in the free-
dom He provides that I can do my duty
without resentment.

There is no doubt that the circum-
stances are tragic. The coming of
war is a terrible thing. The
separation from my family and my
church will not be easy, for me or
them. Yet the Lord is my strength.
He is my portion. It is right that
my children come to understand this
too, that happiness for them will
come when they can see by faith
that God, the Almighty Lord, is
their portion as well. He is my
shield and buckler, He is my light
and my salvation, He is my song, He
is my helper, what can man do to me?

If I felt that what America was doing
was unjust or evil I want you to know
that I would say so. In this situation
I feel we are doing what is right. My
hope and prayer is for peace. My hope
is that our strength will cause the
enemy to turn back so we will not have

to fight. Please pray with me for peace. Don't make the mistake of catching the fever for war and miss the goal of justice and righteousness.

How is the Christian to be a person of peace in the midst of the engines of war? We must always view war as a tragedy, but it is not always the worst tragedy.

Pray that we as a people will be humble before the Lord, repenting of our own sins, remembering the humanity of the soldiers in the "other" army."⁴³

This letter is quoted at some length because it speaks so well to the "spirit" of this paper. There is an added dynamic in the Chaplain Corps that is there because it is a team of Active and Reserve. Our ministry to the Army community, in peace and in war, is strengthened through our integration as a Total Force team. The Reserve chaplain, a citizen-pastor as well as citizen-soldier, brings to the team and its ministry a link to his civilian congregation, and another perspective, that enriches our ministry to soldiers and their families. Furthering that integration will make us that much stronger in meeting the challenges of the Vanguard Army, today and in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. On the sea and airlift deployment see the following articles: Generals Glen K. Otis, Frederick J. Kroesen, Louis C. Wagner, Jr., "Our Deployment Into the Persian Gulf - Three Views," Army, November 1990, pp. 11-18. Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, "Surge and Sustainment," Sea Power, November 1990, pp. 39-45. L. Edgar Prina, "Jones Committee Focuses on Sealift Deficiencies," Sea Power, November 1990. John G. Roos, "While DoD Sorts Out Sealift Shortfall, Army Planners Packaging the Force," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1990, pp. 18-20. James Kitfield, "Dash to the Desert," Government Executive, November 1990, pp. 14-32.

2. Joshua Hammer, "You Must be the Thunder and Lightning", Newsweek, January 28, 1991, p. 31.

3. John Keegan, Washington Post, March 3, 1991.

4. Refer to endnote 1.

5. Peter Turnley, "The Road to War," Newsweek, January 28, 1991, pp. 54-65. James Kitfield, op. cit., pp. 14-32. Both articles are fascinating treatments of events leading up to the war.

6. Michael Barone, "This Time They're Heroes," U.S. News and World Report, March 18, 1991, p. 15, Tom Morganthau, "The Military's New Image," Newsweek, March 11, 1991, pp. 50-51. Numerous other articles on same subject.

7. COL. Frederick Oelrich, "Graduated Mobilization Response," The Officer, October 1990, pp. 25-32. Honorable Stephen M. Duncan, "America's Reliance on Its Reserve Forces Is Nothing New," The Officer, March 1991, pp. 34-43.

8. James Kitfield, "Total Force", Government Executive, March 1991, and "Dash to the Desert," p. 14.

9. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, March 1990, pp. 25 and 27.

10. Kitfield, "Total Force," op. cit., p. 11.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 1976. COL. Harry Summers, Jr. USA (Ret.), On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Norato: Presidio Press, 1982.

12. General Frederick C. Weyand, "Vietnam Myths and American Realities," Commanders Call, July-August 1976.

13. Gen. Glen K. Otis, op. cit., p. 11.

14. Hon. Stephen M. Duncan, op. cit., p. 39.

15. James Kitfield, "Dash to the Desert," op. cit., p. 14.

16. Duncan, op. cit., p. 42.

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